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bstract
Using a panel of 44 developed and developing countries, this paper analyzes the macro-environmental determinants of Internet financial reporting
IFR) within the context of corporate governance models, and thus, addresses the question of which governance model’s disclosure demands are
ore associated with IFR. Both physical and institutional infrastructures are shown to be important determinants of a country’s adoption of IFR.
long with the corporate governance structure, these infrastructures combine with IFR to enhance transparency and market efficiency, both major
oals of financial reporting and disclosure. These findings point to requisite environmental infrastructures governments must provide or foster
or firms within their confines to effectively adopt IFR and thus, reap the attendant benefits of disclosure. They also contribute to the debate on
armonization of international financial reporting by showing that requisite environmental infrastructures are a precondition for the success of any
eporting system.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
The realization of Internet’s enormous benefits has led to
ts incorporation in many areas of production. Capital markets
overnance is one such area, as governments and regulatory
odies across countries have encouraged some Internet-based
nancial reporting and disclosure (e.g., SEC, 2002; Lymer
nd Debreceny, 2003, p. 104; and Regulation FD in the US).
inancial reporting and disclosure are complementary means
f ameliorating information asymmetry between managers and
arties contracting with their firm, including shareholders,
enders, suppliers, customers, etc. (Ball, 2001) – and the resul-
ant decline in opacity enhances financial markets efficiencies
nd reduces both cost of capital and investors’ risks, among other
dvantages. Internet financial reporting (IFR) embodies this apt∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +27 11 717 3764; fax: +27 11 717 3849.
E-mail address: Kalu.ojah@wits.ac.za (K. Ojah).
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
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fricagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.efinition of “total disclosure”,1 and its adoption is a function of
he demand for material information on firms by stakeholders.
his demand is in turn systemically determined by the domi-
ant corporate governance model in the country. Furthermore,
he extent to which material information reaches stakeholders
n a good form and time depends largely on the availability of
equisite institutional and physical infrastructures that underpin
FR in the country.
The literature on financial reporting and disclosure depicts
FR as an embodiment of total disclosure that is aimed at reduc-
ng information asymmetry between shareholders and managers
f a firm (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002). It is
n important way of resolving agency problems. Agency prob-
ems arise when managers entrusted with the responsibility ofolders are unsure that managers’ decisions are value-enhancing
nd not self-serving. These agency problems, when manifested
1 Ball (2001) defines “Total disclosure” to include both auditable company
nformation (verifiability: relating to income statement, balance sheet and other
nancial statement items) and non-auditable information (future cash-flow-
ltering expectations: relating to R&D, M&A, managers’ earnings forecast, and
ew market events). These varied kinds of information require a dissemina-
ion mechanism such as IFR which is characterized by content flexibility, reach,
peed and economies of scale; particularly where stakeholders are dispersed and
nformation asymmetry is important.
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n value-decreasing investments or high opacity, tend to galva-
ize shareholders into the kind of activism aimed at increasing
nformation on managerial decisions (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985;
ediker and Seth, 1995). Such transparency by management
nhances the prudence of managerial decisions and congruency
f shareholders and managers’ interests; and ultimately miti-
ates agency costs (e.g., in the form of lower cost of capital)
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In fact, the financial reporting and
isclosure literature document a negative correlation between
rms’ increased disclosure and indicators of information asym-
etry between firms and their stakeholders (Frankel et al., 1995;
otosan, 1997; Chen et al., 2007). Frankel et al. (1995) and Chen
t al. (2007) highlight the point that the ultimate goal of increased
isclosure is the reduction in cost of external finance (i.e.,
fficiency of financial markets) – whether this works through
educed information asymmetry premium, reduced liquidity pre-
ium or reduced agency cost that is attributable to enhanced
orporate governance.
Guided by recent works on financial reporting and disclo-
ure (Ball et al., 1999, 2000a,b; Kothari, 2000), we link the
doption of IFR to the corporate governance model for which
t is most likely to meet the disclosure imperatives – i.e., under
he diffuse shareholder governance model versus the concen-
rated stakeholder ownership model.2 In the process, the need
or either a governance model shift or a disclosure content modi-
cation for the adoption of IFR is highlighted. Potential requisite
nfrastructures for effective financial reporting and disclosure are
iscussed, with a sketch of how these infrastructures are linked
o adoption of IFR.
Three key questions emanate from this framework of IFR
doption: (1) How important are macro-environmental factors
n facilitating the adoption of meaningful IFR by firms in a coun-
ry? In other words, upon accounting for the efficiency gain
otivation for IFR adoption by individual firms, will firms in
ountries with varying enabling macro-environments be equally
ikely to adopt IFR? For IFRs to be “meaningful” and thus con-
istent with its depiction as an enhancer of total disclosure,
t must, in content and form, be at par or better than paper-
ased financial reporting. (2) Do these varying cross-country
acro-environments’ resultant different corporate governance
tructures correlate differently with IFR adoption? For instance,
iven the agency literature’s postulation that in the presence
f information asymmetry managers are likely to choose a
et of decisions that maximize their own utility, the adoption
f IFR may be more useful in an environment characterized
y the separation of ownership and control than otherwise.
hat is, the cross-country differences in corporate governance
odels and enabling physical and institutional infrastructures
uggest a likelihood of international variation in the adoption
2 This grouping of corporate governance forms into two models is based
argely on the prevalent corporate ownership structure in a country, as articu-
ated by Kothari (2000): The diffuse shareholder model describes a governance
rrangement where the corporation is owned mainly by widely dispersed, indi-
idually atomistic shareholders. The concentrated stakeholder ownership model
escribes governance arrangements where the corporation exhibits concentrated
wnership by families, banks, government agents and workers.
p
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f IFR, and consequently might require that it be discrimi-
ately embarked upon. (3) Upon taking into account prevailing
acro-environments of a country, the dominant national cor-
orate governance structure, and firm-specific efficiency gain
otivations for adopting IFR, do firms’ adoption of IFR still
chieve the ultimate goal of enhanced efficiency of production
reduced cost of capital)?
These three main questions are subjected to robust empir-
cal examinations. Briefly, there is strong evidence that both
hysical and institutional infrastructures determine the propen-
ity of adopting IFR by a country, with four of the analyzed
acro-environmental factors – computer/telecommunication
nfrastructure, financial market scope (economic), political and
egal institutions – dominantly influencing a firm’s adoption
f IFR, even in the face of firm-specific efficiency gains of
FR usage. Further, the national corporate governance struc-
ure, which partly determines reach/speed of dissemination
nd content details of material information provided to firms’
takeholders, is found to play a role in the adoption of IFR.
mportantly, IFR, as an embodiment of total disclosure, is
ound to retain its ultimate essence of reducing cost of capital
ven after considering other relevant factors such as macro-
nvironmental infrastructures and dominant national corporate
overnance practice.
This study emphasizes the corporate governance context and
hus, the agency cost mitigation of financial disclosure, by inte-
rating the literatures on IFR adoption (Ashbaugh et al., 1999;
ebreceny and Gray, 1999; and others) and the importance of
nancial disclosure and its linkages to infrastructure require-
ents (Ball et al., 1999; Kothari, 2000; Ball, 2001).3 It examines
nancial disclosure across 44 governance environments (12
eveloped economies and 32 developing economies) and thus,
rovides useful comparative analysis. It breaks new ground by
onsidering macro-environment predictors of firms’ propensity
o disclose financial information on the Internet. Prior works
n the area focused primarily on firm-level analysis (Ashbaugh
t al., 1999; Debreceny and Gray, 1999; Ettredge et al., 2002).4
mportantly, we examine the robustness of the accepted notion
hat increased voluntary disclosure, by mitigating information
symmetry, ultimately reduces cost of capital (i.e., enhances
arket efficiency). Finally, the findings here contribute to the
ebate on harmonization of international financial reporting sys-
ems by showing, in agreement with Kothari (2000), Ball (2001)
nd others, that whichever reporting system is adopted will likely
e ineffectual unless the enabling environments are provided
rst.
In the remainder of the paper, the background of the paper is
resented: wherein the theoretical framework that underlines the
ertinent testable hypotheses is laid out. Section 3 discusses the
erivation of hypotheses. Next, the study’s data are described.
3 This integration is akin to Li’s (2005) contextualization of information and
ommunication technology application within relation-based and rule-based
overnance systems.
4 Debreceny et al. (2002) is a notable exception. They consider the IFR-
dopting firm’s IT and disclosure environments in their analysis.
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ection 5 presents tests and discussions of results. Section 6
oncludes the paper by highlighting important theoretical and
olicy contributions, and areas needing further research.
. Background and theory
At the onset, the pertinent question to ask is: why mandate
hat public companies report material information to all cur-
ent and potential stakeholders of these companies? One of the
niversal key responsibilities of governments is to protect their
itizens against harm and exploitation, including ensuring that
rms that are permitted to source funds from the public provide
o the public all material information. If all material informa-
ion is to be made available to “all needing it,” what medium
fficiently disseminates the information and thus, fosters best
orporate governance? From the standpoint of economics and
ocial capital maintenance, these questions are universally valid.
he Internet has undeniable provisions that add value to the dis-
losure process of firms, there are considerations to attaining
hese provisions that require we ponder the nature and relative
roximity of target information-recipients to management and
he adequacy of requisite infrastructures for effectively dissemi-
ating disclosures. Thus, the adoption of Internet technology in
he disclosure process appears to be a function of these consid-
rations: the corporate governance context and the adequacy of
nabling infrastructures.
Recalling the well-known asymmetric information problems
n financial markets, one can surmise that disclosure mechanisms
hich do not strive for total disclosure are likely to exacerbate
he market failures or consequences attributable to information
symmetry – i.e., high cost of capital (Myers and Majluf, 1984;
reenwald et al., 1984; Stiglitz, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia,
991; and others). Therefore, the quest is about effectively lim-
ting the asymmetric information problem that is characteristic
f financial markets, and ascertaining which corporate gover-
ance model benefits more from the IFR’s implied wideness of
each, comprehensiveness of content, and voluntary nature of
isclosure and dissemination?
.1. Advantages of Internet ﬁnancial reporting (IFR)
To appreciate the complementary features of Internet as a
isclosure dissemination medium, let us first look at some of its
dvantages. With increased globalization of production activi-
ies, viable and competitive firms now source external finance
oth domestically and internationally. Internet serves as a fan-
astic medium for delivering publicly listed firms’ material
nformation in a timely fashion to foreign and often sophisticated
nvestors.
In the same vein that it provides timely release of material
nformation to widely distributed current and potential investors,
ome Internet reports of companies provide software that per-
its Internet users to do on-the-spot and interactive financialnalyses and communicate to firms in real-time at a relatively
nexpensive cost. IFR permits firms to cheaply disseminate
ther company-specific information. It offers massive oppor-
unities that are beyond investors-relations related benefits. As
p
d
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agenhofer (2003) notes: “By placing financial information on
he firm’s website, users can search, filter, retrieve, download,
nd even reconfigure such information at low cost in a timely
ashion. The Internet allows for hyperlinks, search engines, mul-
imedia, and interactivity. . . the Internet opens up new disclosure
pportunities”. Moreover, Wagenhofer notes that IFR offers
qual access to all users and reduces the information advantages
f some institutional investors relative to others (democratiza-
ion of capital markets). In this study, we conservatively define
FR as not only containing equivalent detailed information as
onventional paper-based reports, at the least, but also as a report
resented in a format that enhances accessibility and/or flexibil-
ty of usage (Ettredge et al., 2002). A fuller definition follows in
ection 3.1.
.2. Challenges of Internet ﬁnancial reporting
Amidst these IFR advantages, exist some limiting traits: Inter-
et is more accessible to sophisticated current and potential
takeholders than to all in the public. This can have important
ecurities markets efficiency-decreasing consequences (Tong,
007). A special issue of the European Accounting Review
1999) reports on the use of Internet for financial disclosure
n Europe. The consensus is that many large firms are increas-
ngly using the Internet to voluntarily disseminate information
han medium and small firms. The content issue of IFR is also
ighlighted as an important impediment.
Lymer and Debreceny (2003) provide one of the most com-
rehensive analyses on the content challenges of IFR in terms
f possible breaches of the integrity of audited reports. They
xamine these challenges in countries with developed securities
arkets, where firms have voluntarily adopted IFR (e.g., US,
K, Canada, etc.). They note that unlike paper-based reporting,
FR (1) moves as well as leaves undefined the boundaries of
uditors’ effective authentication of financial reports. (2) The
echnology of the IFR, while permitting the disclosure of more
nformation at more affordable costs than paper-based report-
ng, can impinge on the integrity of the information. Debreceny
nd Gray (1999) summarize this aspect of IFR challenges by the
ollowing questions: (i) Is the audit opinion safe from change
y the client or other party? (ii) Should the Web-based auditor’s
eport reside at the auditor’s website? (iii) What weight should
e given to an auditor’s report date when documents on the Web
an be changed?
Lymer and Debreceny suggest these challenges are respon-
ible for the empirical finding that less than 40% of the hitherto
urveyed IFRs contain auditor’s endorsement. For interested
eaders, note that possible solutions proffered for these content
elated challenges of IFR are framed in the form of plugging the
ap between IFR and the Internet reporting technology (IASC,
999; Debreceny and Gray, 2001; Lymer and Debreceny, 2003,
p. 114–117).
A set of environmental challenges of IFR, including the
igital divide, financial market scope, legal and political envi-
onment, is a major focus here. And the extent to which they are
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onsidered for the successful adoption of IFR is articulated in
he following conceptual model.
.3. A theoretical framework of IFR adoption
The theoretical framework sketched here posits that the
ffective adoption of IFR is a function of both the corporate
overnance model that demands a specific kind of disclosure
content, reach and speed of delivery) and the requisite infras-
ructures which support that specific kind of disclosure. Inspired
y Denis (2001), corporate governance is defined here as the set
f identifiable arrangements that determine how the manage-
ent of a corporation (agent) ensures that stakeholders’ (equity
olders, creditors, suppliers, government and employees) claims
n the firm are not materially different than their intrinsic val-
es. From this definition emanates three salient deductions: (1)
corporation is characterized by the separation of controllers
nd stakeholders, which raises the need for alignment of inter-
sts – agency issues; (2) the need for communicating controllers’
ffort in optimizing stakeholders’ claims – disclosure issues; and
3) the realization that the composition of stakeholders affects
anagement of issues 1 and 2 – ownership structure issues.
hese three issues form the basis of a governance model’s link
o effective adoption of IFR.
Issues 1 and 2 point to the imperatives for financial reporting
nd disclosure (Stiglitz, 1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991;
evitt, 1999; La Porta et al., 2000; Mishkin, 2006; and others),
hile issue 3 suggests there will be variation in the details of
he disclosure – heterogeneous information demands (Kothari,
000; Ball et al., 2000a,b; Ball, 2001; and others) and thus, vari-
tion in the mode of disseminating the disclosure – arm’s length
nd dispersed (IFR) or private (meeting reports, conference
alls, and other personal communication media). It is there-
ore evident that IFR is a function of the prevailing corporate
overnance model and the availability of requisite institutional
nfrastructures that adequately support total disclosure. These
nfrastructures are, in turn, partly determined by the required
etails of the disclosure. The following schematic encapsulates
hese relationships. For the purpose of this schematic, Kothari’s
2000) grouping of corporate governance models into the diffuse
hareholder and the concentrated stakeholder ownership mod-
ls is adopted.The contextualization of IFR adoption points to
ts newness as an information disclosure technology.5 However,
ts level of adoption across countries varies; thus, adoption eco-
omics offers guidance on possible reasons for cross-country
ariation in IFR adoption (Bass, 1996; Li and Pinsky, 2005;
attoni and Cuomo, 2008; and others). Bass’ (1996) leading
ork and the bulk of adoption economics in the marketing lit-rature focus on how consumers adopt new products. One can
herefore view firms as the consumers of this new disclosure
echnology and ask what would motivate them to adopt it? This
5 According to Li and Pinsker (2005), IFR can be considered a new technology
ecause it is a practice and material artifact which its adopters (publicly traded
rms) perceive to be new (Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge
t al., 2002).
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iewpoint suggests that firm-specific characteristics can explain
hy individual firms adopt IFR. Viewing adoption with a wider
ens, Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) note that the adoption of new
ractices within a system may be explained either by efficiency
ain possibilities or by social legitimation (institutional) pres-
ures. Efficiency gain can be explained by the motivation for
rms’ voluntary and effective disclosure of information – i.e.,
eduction of informational opacity premium in cost of capital,
s elucidated in Section 1. Social legitimation pressure is that
taken-for-grantedness” which suggests adoption of a new tech-
ology because it is socially expected, driven by a confluence
f institutional dictates. The efficiency gain motivation points
argely to firm-specific reasons for adopting a new technology
hile social legitimation implies that environmental factors also
etermine adoption of a new technology.6
Among others that have studied the adoption of IFR,
agenhofer (2003) is prominent in enumerating the efficiency
ains that accrue from Web-based dissemination of company
nformation to its stakeholders and customers. Current works on
FR, have focused on this efficiency gain motivation and have
ound some consensus firm-specific determinants of IFR adop-
ion (e.g., Ashbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny and Gray, 1999;
ymer, 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2002;
agenhofer, 2003).
To sum up, we have sketched the link between the new
isclosure technology (IFR), transparency and corporate gov-
rnance enhancement; and thus, point to the role of institutions
n the social legitimation (expectedness) of IFR adoption. Ball
2001) provides guidance on the possible nexus between an
ffective disclosure (embodied by IFR), and requisite envi-
onmental infrastructures for financial reporting and disclosure
total disclosure). He posits that the properties and quality of
otal disclosure are a function of the complementary interactions
f the country’s legal, economic and political infrastructures. In
he following section, we elaborate a bit on the theoretical under-
innings of linkages sketched in Fig. 1, and present testable
ypotheses emanating from the conceptual model.
. Hypotheses and variable deﬁnitions
Ball’s (2001) guidance enabled us to sketch the nexus
etween total disclosure (embodied by IFR), and requi-
ite environmental infrastructures for total disclosure: labeled
Hypothesis I” in Fig. 1. To appreciate hypotheses around adop-
ion of IFR, it is important that we define IFR first.
.1. Deﬁnition of IFRWe define a meaningful adoption of IFR by partly following
ebreceny et al. (2002, pp. 282–385). Using the top 30 listed
6 It is worth noting at this juncture the likelihood of conflicting motivations
or IFR adoption by a firm. A firm in a country characterized by unstable
nd ineffective governance environment (political institution) and inadequate
omputer/telecom infrastructure might find that the efficiency gain of adopting
FR (as articulated by Wagenhofer, 2003) is but a possibility contingent on yet
navailable infrastructures.
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Corporate 
Governance Model 
• Diffuse 
shareholder 
model 
• Concentrated 
stakeholder 
ownership model 
Internet Financial 
Reporting (IFR) 
Disclosure Form/Reach 
• Detailed and arms-
length distribution to 
outsiders 
• General and private 
distribution to 
outsiders 
Infrastructure & Institutions 
A- Physical 
• Computer/telecom 
infrastructure 
B- Institutional 
• Economic/financial 
market infrastructure 
• Legal infrastructure 
• Political infrastructure 
Demand source 
Information need 
Supply source 
Enablers 
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fiig. 1. This figure conceptualizes adoption of IFR within the context of macro-en
subsumes tests of Eq. (1) while Hypothesis II reflects tests of Eq. (2).
rms, by market capitalization, reported for each of the sam-
le countries from the Osiris company reports of Bureau van
ijk for the period 1990–2008, we search company Web sites
or availability of summary financial reports or better for each
ear. If a company has financial reports as detailed as those in
raditional paper-based reports (and/or more dynamic, as with
yperlinks and videos), and they are presented in HTML and/or
ownloadable PDF forms, the firm is categorized as using IFR
identified as 1); if the Web reported content comprises either
ummarized financial reports or income statement and/or bal-
nce sheet in only HTML or PDF form, the firm is reported as
artially reporting (identified as 0); and if it has no Web based
eport it is identified by 0. Then a country is classified as a mean-
ngful IFR country (=1) if the number of firms identified as 1
s a proportion of the 30 top capitalization firms is greater than
he median of this same ratio for all firms in the same economic
evelopment country-group (i.e., a developed or an emerging
conomy), and classified as a non-IFR country (=0) otherwise.7
This measurement scheme for IFR is conservative because we
eek to classify a country as having adopted meaningful usage
f IFR by the practice of 30 of its most sizeable firms (how-
ver these top 30 firms in most countries, particularly emerging
arket ones, dominate their national industrial space).8 Our
7 We specifically employed an accounting professional that is quite familiar
ith various frames of financial reports and what constitutes standard contents.
everal search samples were examined for validation before search and classifi-
ation exercise proceeded. Further, note that a few of the countries, particularly
merging market economies, have less than 30 listed firms; therefore, the base
or computing percentage of IFR adoption was less than 30 for such countries.
8 Our conservative IFR measurement is reasonably conceptualized and guided
y extant literature. Like all empirical constructs it is not full-proof; a possible
eakness is that a country with many listed companies (say >100 firms) may
ave all its top 30 firms using IFR because by virtue of the high fixed cost of
dopting IFR mainly large firms have the wherewithal, whereas the top 30 firms
f a country with fewer listed firms may have small firms in the mix. However,
he countries with few listed firms are exclusively emerging market economies;
enerally their listed firms are, relatively speaking, their large firms. This
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“ment factors and dominant national corporate governance structures. Hypothesis
easurement scheme is further inspired by Ettredge et al. (2002)
ho observe that firms which publish their reports in both HTML
nd PDF formats are those that seek to exploit fully the capa-
ilities of the Internet for financial reporting and disclosure.
lternatively, we simply report each country’s IFR profile by
omputing the number of firms identified as 1 as a proportion of
he 30 top capitalization firms. This form is used for identifying
he evolving nature of IFR adoption among countries, as well as
n some of the empirical tests.
.2. Macro-environmental determinants of IFR adoption
Political environment. While discussing the economic impor-
ance of financial reporting and disclosure, Ball et al. (1999,
000a,b) and Ball (2001) surmise that pushing for adoption of
ny form of accounting reporting standards is insufficient for
chieving total disclosure if the political environment’s influence
n disclosure is not considered. Among other lacking comple-
entary environmental infrastructures, these papers show how
ve East Asian countries (Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand,
ingapore and China), respectively, failed to achieve efficient
isclosure despite adopting best practice accounting reporting
tandards. Political environments that fostered cronyism, fam-
ly pyramidal ownership of firms, corrupt contract enforcement,
nconstrained granting of discretion to managers of state-owned
nterprises to manipulate earnings reports for political expedi-
ncy, etc., were counted important reasons for these failures.
uch political environments lend themselves to private “within
ew block stakeholders” dissemination of disclosure, as opposed
o the arms’-length dissemination mechanism (IFR) required
y diffuse shareholder ownership environment from where the
egularity therefore mitigates this identified weakness to some extent. Further,
ote that during the late 1990s to 2008 all countries had some of their firms
sing some form of IFR; thus, those identified by 0 IFR had “partial” informa-
ion reporting via IFR. We also examine an alternative construct which identifies
partial IFR” as 1, for robustness.
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dopted good accounting standards emanate (e.g., US and UK).
stable political environment which encourages accountabil-
ty, individual/group rights and governance effectiveness, would
oster expectation of adoption of an effective disclosure mecha-
ism such as IFR than a less stable one.
1. A more stable political environment will be associated
ith high adoption of the IFR.
Political environment (PE) is computed as the average score
f three political governance indicators – political stability and
bsence of violence, government effectiveness, and voice and
ccountability – put together for the World Bank by Kaufmann
t al. (2008). Each governance dimension is scored from 2.5 (for
ighest outcomes) to −2.5 (for lowest outcomes).
Legal environment. The social legitimation explanation of
nnovation adoption can perhaps be best illustrated within the
egal environment. It has become almost a common refrain that
FR is both far-reaching and cost effective as an information
isclosure/dissemination mechanism (Ashbaugh et al., 1999;
ebreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2002; Wagenhofer, 2003;
nd others). Upon the believe that the Internet medium is most
ffective at disseminating material information quickly and with
ess content filtering by managers of firms (Verrecchia, 1983;
rankel et al., 1995), society may come to expect its adoption
nd perhaps legislate it. The South African JSE’s demand for
igrating financial reporting to the Internet on the claim of both
wider reach and cost effectiveness is a clear example. Thus,
rms can adopt IFR in response to the demands of the legal envi-
onment. It is an effective legal environment which has good
aws and rules on the books as well as enforces them that would
e more successful at demanding and eliciting adoption of gov-
rnance enhancement practice, such as IFR, than would a less
ffective legal environment. Therefore, we hypothesis that:
2. An effective legal environment will be positively associ-
ted with the adoption of IFR.
Similar to the PE construct, legal environment (LE) is com-
uted as the average score of three legal governance indicators
rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption – put
ogether for the World Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2008). Each
overnance dimension is scored from 2.5 (for highest outcomes)
o −2.5 (for lowest outcomes).
Financial market environment. Kothari (2000) provides an
nsightful summary of the literature on how legal environment
f countries dictate resultant financial market types and the
ifferential disclosure demands of the distinct markets. Rely-
ng largely on the seminal works of La Porta et al. (1997,
998, 1999, 2000) alongside Ball et al. (1999, 2000a,b), Kothari
otes the finding that international variation in investor protec-
ion laws, which is in turn tied to differences in origins of the
egal environment, is related to international differences in the
nancing and ownership of firms. Several authors have gone
urther to show how important these legal environments are in
roducing the resulting financial institutions and markets of var-
ous countries (e.g., La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; Levine, 1999;
laessens and Laeven, 2003; Beck and Levine, 2004; Laeven
nd Woodruff, 2007). Arguably the consensus in the literature
3
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s that financial markets where ownership of firms is dispersed
ould require a disclosure mechanism that disseminates mate-
ial information widely and quickly than financial markets where
wners/stakeholders of firms are few and concentrated.
3. We expect a large size/scope financial market, which
roxy dispersed distribution of firms’ ownership, to be positively
elated to IFR adoption.
Financial markets scope/environment (FMS) is measured by
verage of the ratio of publicly listed firms in a country to mean
ublicly listed firms in the group the country belongs, ratio of
arket value of equity securities outstanding in a country to the
ountry’s GDP, and ratio of annual value of equity securities
raded in a country to the country’s GDP. The data for these
ariables are culled from the International Finance Corporation,
he International Monetary Fund and the World Development
ndicator databases.
Physical infrastructure. In a European Accounting Review
1999) special issue on IFR, Lymer reports that only 15% of the
K population is a regular user of the Web. This accessibility
icture is reflective of Internet use reality globally, wherein only
he United States and perhaps Japan has a better picture. The
ajority of countries in the world, particularly developing ones,
are no better than the European picture. This is the well-known
nd documented “Digital Divide” – a codification of the fact
hat the majority of people who live in developing countries
ave no access to computers and far lesser have access to the
nternet. A study by Chinn and Fairlie (2004) found that in 2001
here were 61 computers per 100 people in the US. In Europe
nd Central Asia, there were 18 computers per 100 people. In
outh Asia there were 0.5 computers per 100 people. They note
hat all countries with high Internet penetration rates, including
ustralia, are relatively wealthy with the exception of South
orea. They also highlight the skewed distribution of penetration
ates across regions and countries: computer penetration rate in
he US is 550 times larger than the penetration rate in Ethiopia.
he study finds that income per capita accounts for 53.4% of
he gap between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa PC
se, and 40.7% of the gap is accounted for by differences in
elecommunications (largely physical) infrastructure. Therefore,
he more available the physical infrastructure for IFR there is in
country, the more likely firms in the country are to adopt IFR.
4. We expect a positive correlation between availability of
omputer/telecom infrastructure and IFR adoption.
We measure availability of computer/telecom infrastructure
CTI) in each sample country by averaging the number of fixed
elephone lines per 100 people, estimated number of internet
sers per 100 people, and number of mobile-phone subscribers
er 100 people. The data for this measure are drawn from the
nternational Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Pyramid
esearch databases..3. Firm-speciﬁc determinants of IFR adoption
Firm size. We follow mainly the guide from Debreceny et al.
2002) and Ettredge et al. (2002) in deriving our expectations
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f firm-specific determinants of IFR adoption. Among others
hat have studied the adoption of IFR, Wagenhofer (2003) is
rominent in enumerating the efficiency gains that accrues from
eb-based dissemination of company information to its stake-
olders and customers. IFR’s reach of internationally dispersed
takeholders for example and its scope for using same medium to
ommunicate mandated financial information, investors relation
ssues and product awareness, the net cost advantage of elimi-
ating printing and distribution expenses versus Web site set-up
xpense, suggest that large size firms are more likely to adopt
FR than small, domestically focused firms (see Ashbaugh et al.,
999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al., 2002). Large firms
enerally have a reputational capital to protect and would want to
ppear, if not overtly, forthcoming in providing and disseminat-
ng information to the many and dispersed interest groups that
ollow the firms’ activities than would small firms (Diamond,
991).
5. We expect firm size (Size) to be positively associated with
he adoption of IFR.
As in Ashbaugh et al. (1999), Debreceny et al. (2002) and
ttredge et al. (2002), we compute firm size as the log of total
sset or equity market capitalization.
External ﬁnance need. As noted in the introduction sec-
ion, the financial reporting and disclosure literature document
negative correlation between firms’ increased disclosure and
ndicators of information asymmetry between firms and their
takeholders (Welker, 1995; Frankel et al., 1995; Botosan, 1997;
ealy et al., 1999; Ho and Wong, 2001; Chen et al., 2007).
rankel et al. (1995) highlight the consensus that the ultimate
oal of increased disclosure is the reduction in cost of external
nance – which among other channels, works through reduced
nformation asymmetry premium. Therefore, firms which are
isproportionately in need of external finance would be more
elcoming of a disclosure mechanism, such as IFR, which
ermits dissemination of various types of information quickly,
idely and relatively inexpensively, than firms that need little or
o external finance.
6. We expect high external finance need to be positively
orrelated with the adoption of IFR.
Borrowing a leaf from Rajan and Zingales (1998), we rely on
ow-of-funds accounting of firms to define the extent to which
firm relies on external funding (EFD). It is computed as:
xternal finance dependence = capital expenditure − (oper(Operating cashflo
A positive measure indicates that the firm relies on external
nance to cover its capital investments needs (without consider-
ng working-capital which are usually smaller amounts, largely
unded by current liabilities or relatively cheaper money market
oans).
Proﬁtability. Supposing efficiency gain is a firm’s dominant
otivation for adopting IFR, one would expect the most com-
on representation of efficiency gain – profitability – to be
ositively correlated with IFR. Further, size can be a reflection
f a firm’s success, suggesting that large firms are likely to be
s
b
t
eevelopment Finance 2 (2012) 69–83 75
cash flow + depreciation)
+ depreciation)
rofitable as well and thus, highly likely to adopt IFR (recall:
shbaugh et al., 1999; Debreceny et al., 2002; Ettredge et al.,
002). Ettredge et al. (2002) document that profitable firms are
ore apt to post information quickly on their Web site; partic-
larly as such firms’ information releases are likely to be good
ews. Yet, the point was made above that financial constrained
rms would be motivated to increase information disclosure in
rder to reduce informational opacity premium and access exter-
al capital at a lower cost. It logically follows that profitable firms
ay have sufficient internal equity (from retained earnings) such
hat they are not financially constrained, which in turn suggest
bsence of the need to increase information disclosure for low
ost of capital.
7. Profitability (Profit) is expected to be positively correlated
ith the adoption of IFR.
We measure profitability as the ratio of operating profit to
otal assets.
Based on the forgoing, our analysis of the determination of
FR adoption by firms in our panel of sample countries can be
ncapsulated in the following form:
FRj,t = a0 + β1EDj,t + β2FSDj,t + ρt, (1)
here IFRj,t is Internet financial reporting for country j (j = 1,
, . . ., m) in period t (t = 1, 2, . . ., n), EDj,t and FSDj,t are the
nvironmental and firm-specific determinants, respectively, of
FR adoption in country j at t.
.4. Governance model linkage to IFR adoption
Relying largely on the seminal works of La Porta et al. (1997,
998, 1999, 2000) alongside Ball et al. (1999, 2000a,b), Kothari
2000) notes the finding that international variation in investor
rotection laws, which is in turn tied to differences in legal
rigins of the laws, is related to international differences in
he financing and ownership of firms. He highlights the role
f legal origins on accounting standards, corporate governance
odels and their attendant disclosure systems. He recounts
he work by Ball et al. (2000a,b) where they document that
n “code-law countries, a ‘stakeholder ownership’ governance
odel is likely to be observed, with shareholders, managers
nd employees, the government, and banks (as sharehold-
rs or debt-holders) as major stakeholders. In the stakeholder
overnance model, demand for public disclosure of informa-
ion is diminished because the stakeholders’ agents participate
n corporate governance. This solves much of the information
symmetry problems. . .” Therefore, there is little need for the
ind of detailed information component, time-compressing, and
isperse dissemination of disclosure for which IFR appears best
uited. Given the concentrated ownership by a relatively few
lock-stakeholders prevalent in this governance model, a private
ype dissemination mechanism – conference call, press release,
tc. – appears more appropriate.
7 w of
n
a
t
l
f
t
p
a
c
s
o
I
g
c
e
h
t
m
“
t
H
h
t
g
a
h
m
F
a
n
a
p
w
e
c
s
r
p
g
f
I
t
a
c
n
h
t
c
b
i
e
p
p
c
m
e
M
M
j
r
m
w
a
a
e
T
w
r
4
t
e
i
t
8
a
f
f
d
D
i
–
e
F
U
d
a
for this is that many of the data for environmental variables on
emerging market economies became available in useable time-6 K. Ojah, T. Mokoaleli-Mokoteli / Revie
“In common-law countries, a ‘diffuse shareholder’ gover-
ance model is more likely. In this model, diffuse ownership
nd separation of ownership from control are frequently encoun-
ered. Management and the board of directors generally are not
arge block-holders of debt or equity. . . This creates a demand
or timely public disclosure of financial information, to mitigate
he information asymmetry between managers and current and
otential owners for monitoring the performance of the man-
gers”. The implication here is that in countries where both a
ommon-law legal system predominates and production owner-
hip is diffuse and separated from management, dissemination
f disclosure must be detailed, time- and distance-compressing.
t is in this nature of disclosure demand, by a diffuse shareholder
overnance model, that IFR appears more appropriate, given its
haracteristic flexibility for content form, speed of reach and
conomies of scale. In sum, the two preceding paragraphs show
ow demand for an IFR-embodied type of disclosure is a func-
ion of the demand emanating from the dominant governance
odel of the country – thus, the first block in Fig. 1 captures the
Demand source” – Hypothesis II. Therefore, expectations are
hat:
8. Firms in a country characterized by the “diffuse share-
older corporate governance model” (CGM) will be more likely
o adopt IFR than firms in a country characterized by a different
overnance model.
Following La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000), Kothari (2000)
nd Ball (2001), CGM is identified as 3 if a sample country
as a common-law legal origin, 2 if a country has a Ger-
an/Scandinavian civil-law legal origin, 1 if a country has a
rench civil-law legal origin and 0 if other wise. Given the
doption of US type financial reporting and corporate gover-
ance practices by firms in globally integrated countries, it is
cknowledged that a country’s governance model can evolve,
articularly if defined exclusively by La Porta et al’s frame-
ork (Pagano and Volpin, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Licht
t al., 2005). For a more universally applicable alternative, we
onsider the less-evolving cultural value linked governance mea-
ures suggested by Licht et al. (2005); these CGM measures are
eported in Table A2 in Appendix A.9 Incorporating the cor-
orate governance linkage to IFR adoption, gives the following
eneral relationships which are also captured in the theoretical
ramework.
FRj = αj + β1EDj + β2FSDj + β3CGMj + ε. (2)
CGMj represents country j’s degree of embodying features of
he diffuse shareholder governance model. The other variables
re as defined in Eq. (1).
9 Relying on Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s cultural value dimensions, within the
ontext of cross-cultural psychology, Licht et al. (2005) derive corporate gover-
ance measures mapped across cultural regions. They demonstrate empirically
ow these measures both relate to La Porta et al.’s (1998) framework and cap-
ure well governance models meant to protect investors’ rights via litigation (the
ourts). See Licht et al. (2005) for a fuller discussion of these two cultural region
ased corporate governance structure indicators.
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Finally, we round off this test development section by recall-
ng the need to examine whether firms’ adoption of IFR still
licits the claimed ultimate goal of enhanced efficiency of
roduction (reduced cost of capital) after accounting for the
revailing macro-environment of a country, dominant national
orporate governance structure, and firm-specific efficiency gain
otivations for adopting IFR. The general form of this hypoth-
sis can be captured as:
Ej = αj + β1IFRj + β2CGMj + β3IFRj ∗ CGMj + β4EDj
+β5FSDj + ε. (3)
Ej represents market efficiency, which is defined by country
’s lending–deposit spread for the country’s debt market or the
atio of shares’ value traded to market capitalization of the equity
arket of country j. If country j’s debt market is efficient, it
ill reflect a small spread (cost of debt) and vice versa; the IFR
nd governance variable or infrastructure variables, respectively,
re expected to relate negatively to spread. The equity market
fficiency proxy represents the level of activity in the market.
he more efficient a market is, the higher its level of activity
ill be. IFR, governance variable or infrastructure variables,
espectively, are expected to relate positively to this ratio.10
. Data
The sample is comprised of listed firms from 44 coun-
ries: 12 developed market economies and 32 emerging market
conomies. Though partly dictated by the availability of some
mportant data, the distribution of sample countries is designed
o be regionally representative – 5 from Africa & Mid East,
from East Asia, 3 from South Asia, 8 from Eastern Europe
nd 8 from Latin America, for emerging market economies; 3
rom East Asia, 6 from Europe, 2 from North America and 1
rom Oceana, for developed market economies. Firm-specific
ata are pooled from the Osiris company reports of Bureau van
ijk for the period 1995–2008. Country level data are from var-
ous sources, depending on the nature of the information needed
e.g., World Bank’s Development Indicators and World Gov-
rnance Index, the International Monetary Fund’s International
inancial Statistics and the International Telecommunications
nion (ITU) and Pyramid Research databases. The period for
ata used in the IFR construct is a bit longer than the period for
ll remaining data: 1990–2008 versus 1995–2008. The reasoneries form only in the late 1990s. The number of listed firms
10 Efficient market theories are generally viewed via Fama’s famous hypothe-
es, which takes as given the channels or processes through which asset prices
eflect the relevant/material information about the issuer of the asset. Increased
rading of the asset is a major means by which participants impound relevant
nformation into the asset’s price. This results in high liquidity and low trans-
ction cost on the asset, which in turn, yield a low cost of capital (a major
omponent of the discount factor for deriving the asset price). For more on these
hannels’ linkage to market efficiency, see Kothari (2000), Bhattacharya and
aouk (2002) and Chen et al. (2007), among others.
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Fig. 2. This figure provides graphs of evolutionary mean and median levels of
IFR adoption between developing (32) and developed economies (12) groups of
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nample countries. Range represents the percentage of IFR adoption per sample
ountry’s top 30 listed firms.
er country is dictated by number of firms which consistently
isted in the Osiris reporting frame of Bureau van Dijk.
.1. Evolution of IFR adoption
Given that the adoption of IFR is the focal point of
his research, it is important to gauge the evolution of IFR
sage across these widely distributed sample countries as well
s appreciate possible factors associated with its dynamics.
able A1 in Appendix A presents a detailed country-by-country
volution of IFR adoption along a dichotomy of economic
evelopment levels. Three salient observations are evident: (i)
ooking at the median IFR adoptions for both emerging market
nd developed market economies, the level of adopting IFR is
uch higher in developed economies than emerging economies.
ii) Developed economies commenced meaningful usage of IFR
s early as 1991/1992 while emerging economies commenced
uch usage in 1999/2000 (see the median rows for both economic
evelopment groupings).
These two observations are further highlighted in Fig. 2.
iii) On a country-by-country basis, most early (and hugely)
FR users are Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Hong Kong,
apan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA, almost
ll sampled developed economies while only Brazil, Ecuador,
orea, Malaysia, Turkey and South Africa were early adoptersrom the 32 emerging economy group. There is some evidence
f variability in the adoption of IFR across countries (see the
tandard deviation rows of the Table A1).
(
l
aevelopment Finance 2 (2012) 69–83 77
. Tests and discussion
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of variables used in
nalyzing issues engaged in this study. It is useful in flagging data
ssues that need to be addressed for effective empirical analyses;
or example, standard deviations, skewness or kurtosis of profit
nd external financial dependence (Efd) informed their log trans-
ormation. Given the country level focus of the testable models
f this study, it is expected that many of the macro-environment
ariables would likely be correlated. Therefore, we first, pro-
ide a pair-wise correlation profile of all variables in Table 2.
s anticipated quite a few of the macro-environment variables
re correlated. Consequently, multivariate models of the study
re estimated using clustered standard errors random effect
odels and particularly panel logit models. Clustered standard
rrors control for potential correlation at the firm level while
anel logits control for heterogeneity across firms, collinearity
mong variables, and firm dynamics (Baltagi, 2001). Further,
he Breusch–Pagan test is conducted for all panel models to
scertain there are no random effects. In general, panels are also
nown to mitigate biases that can arise from aggregation.
Results of Eq. (1) are reported in Table 3. The main hypothesis
round the importance of macro-environmental factors in IFR
doption by firms across various countries is largely supported,
s is evident in models 1a–2b (i.e., Hypotheses 1–4). Along with
omputer telecommunication infrastructure (CTI) of a country,
nstitutional infrastructures of political environment (PE) and
nancial market scope (FMS) significantly foster the adoption
f IFR by firms. The legal environment (LE) is also found to
e important but with a negative sign, suggesting that an effec-
ive legal environment rather discourages the adoption of IFR;
hus, leading one to speculate that an effective legal environment
ight not require an additional information dissemination mech-
nism such as IFR. Only one of the firm-specific variables is
ositively associated with IFR adoption – large firms (in accord
ith Hypothesis 5). Profitable firms which generally would have
ittle need for external funds appear not to seek adoption of IFR
i.e., this result clarifies Hypothesis 7.
Next we turn to the result of Eq. (2), which incorporates
ffects of the dominant national corporate governance struc-
ure (CGM) into the general determination of IFR adoption.
able 4 reports the result of Eq. (2). Recall that we had defined
hree different CGM constructs – CGM based on La Porta et
l’s (1997, 1998, 2000) legal origin definition, and CGM2 and
GM3, both based on geographic mapping of cultural value
imensions. As in Licht et al. (2005), these CGM constructs
re different and might capture different aspects of corporate
overnance structure, though with some overlaps (accord-
ng to Table 2, correlations between CGM1–CGM2 = −0.011,
GM1–CGM3 = 0.497, and CGM2–CGM3 = 0.435). The con-
truct based on Schwartz’s global survey of cultural value
imensions, CGM2, enters significantly positively (model 3a) in
xplaining adoption of IFR while that based Hofstede’s multi-
ational company survey, CGM3, enter significantly negatively
model 3c and 4c). Surprisingly, the construct based on the
egal origin postulation does not enter in any of the models; this
ppears to justify the concerns about undue reliance on the legal
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics of variables.
Observations Mean Median Standard deviation Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum
Pe 7209 0.4692 0.5510 0.9010 −0.1631 1.7257 −1.5864 1.8550
Le 7209 0.6446 0.4773 0.9983 −0.0346 1.6252 −1.3932 2.0927
Fms 8004 0.7000 0.4824 0.6716 2.7928 20.017 0.0187 8.7007
Cti 7590 0.3577 0.3076 0.2489 0.3539 1.9320 0.0014 1.0690
Log Profit 7661 −1.6637 −1.6533 0.9090 −0.1658 7.2756 −9.8815 7.7282
Log Efd 1370 −0.3303 −0.2531 1.7485 −0.3291 4.4909 −9.0324 5.8683
Log Spread 7450 1.4540 1.4139 0.7332 0.0893 6.9715 −1.7918 5.3861
Full IFR 8565 0.4136 0.3667 0.3299 0.2756 1.8084 0.0000 1.0000
Full/partial IFR 8620 0.7262 0.9000 0.3445 −1.0239 2.5490 0.0000 1.0000
CGM1 8620 2.8858 3.0000 0.9376 −0.0890 1.6993 1.0000 4.0000
CGM2 7610 3.5716 3.7000 1.0533 0.0277 1.3822 2.3000 5.0000
CGM3 7189 3.6547 3.3000 1.3277 −0.4735 2.2712 1.3000 5.3000
Size 8474 7.0300 7.0760 1.0732 −0.3201 4.9260 0.0000 11.154
Profit 7837 0.5593 0.1857 25.673 88.336 7814.5 −41.938 2271.5
Efd 3943 −0.4894 −0.3105 28.543 −32.137 1429.0 −1324.3 353.65
Spread 7493 5.8385 4.0773 7.8144 8.6893 165.07 −6.9125 218.35
This table presents descriptive statistics of variables that are extensively used in the analyses that follow. Pe is political environment, which is defined as the average
score of three political governance indicators – political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability – put together
for the World Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2008). Each governance dimension is scored from 2.5 (for highest outcomes) to −2.5 (for lowest outcomes). Le is legal
environment, computed as the average score of three legal governance indicators – rule of law, regulatory quality and control of corruption – put together for the World
Bank by Kaufmann et al. (2008). Each governance dimension is scored from 2.5 (for highest outcomes) to −2.5 (for lowest outcomes). Fms is financial market scope,
measured as average of ratio of listed firms in a country to mean publicly listed firms in the group the country belongs, ratio of market value of equity securities in a
country to the country’s GDP, and ratio of annual value of equity securities traded in a country to the country’s GDP. Cti is computer/telecom infrastructure computed
by averaging the number of fixed telephone lines per 100 people, estimated number of internet users per 100 people, and number of mobile-phone subscribers per
100 people. Size represents individual firm’s size which is computed as the log of total asset or equity market capitalization. Profit is the ratio of operating profit to
total assets. Efd is a firm’s degree of dependence on external finance; it is computed as ratio of the difference between capital expenditure and operating cash flow
to operating cash flow. Full IFR stands for Internet financial reporting; it is defined as the percent of top 30 firms in each sample country that posts the equivalent
of hardcopy based annual reports (or better) on the Internet in HTML and/or PDF format. Full/Partial IFR includes both Full IFR and any other level of Internet
reporting by listed top 30 firms in each sample country. CGM national represents corporate governance model of sample countries: CGM1 is based on La Porta
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pread is the proxy for cost of external capital, computed as the difference betw
rigin based construct of corporate governance models (Pagano
nd Volpin, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Licht et al., 2005).
hough the CGM results are mixed in terms of its effects on
FR, depending on how it is defined, these results neverthe-
ess suggest, as hypothesized (H8), that corporate governance
emands of information in both content detail and speed of deliv-
ry are important in determining adoption of IFR. Once more, the
acro-environmental determinants of IFR remain consistently
trong in most of the models of this table (models 3a–4c).
e
i
t
able 2
imple correlations between test variables.
Pe Le Fms Cti Size Ef
e
e 0.955
ms 0.428 0.484
ti 0.768 0.718 0.548
ize 0.033 0.064 0.027 −0.093
fd 0.005 0.007 −0.014 −0.013 0.022
rofit −0.040 −0.019 0.054 −0.049 0.152 −0
GM1 0.412 0.538 0.677 0.491 −0.121 −0
GM2 0.574 0.467 0.139 0.370 −0.143 0
GM3 0.590 0.522 0.403 0.554 −0.150 0
e 0.440 0.418 0.518 0.529 −0.081 0
ull-IFR 0.608 0.510 0.572 0.786 −0.033 −0
ull/partial IFR 0.335 0.201 0.376 0.564 −0.008 −0on geographic mapping of cultural value dimensions (see Table A2 for details).
ational lending and deposit rates.
Finally, the analysis turns to whether firms’ adoption of
FR still elicits the claimed ultimate goal of enhanced effi-
iency of production (reduced cost of capital) after accounting
or the prevailing macro-environment of a country, dominant
ational corporate governance structure, and firm-specific effi-
iency gain motivations for adopting IFR. Therefore, Eq. (3) is
stimated using the 2-Stage Least Square (2SLS). The 2SLS
s used because the IFR has been shown to be endogenous
o almost all of the macro-environment variables. Results in
d Profit CGM1 CGM2 CGM3 Me Full-IFR
.003
.033 −0.037
.038 −0.060 −0.011
.003 −0.121 0.497 0.435
.015 −0.146 0.369 0.121 0.478
.011 −0.004 0.309 0.502 0.444 0.438
.022 −0.004 0.177 0.368 0.236 0.276 0.783
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Table 3
Macro-environment models of Internet financial reporting (IFR) adoption.
Clustered standard error based estimates of random effect models Panel logit based models
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Pe 1.858***(5.24) 1.837*** (5.18)
Le −0.028 (−1.59) −0.021 (−1.21) −1.252*** (−3.98) −1.244*** (−3.95)
Fms 0.070*** (7.79) 0.070*** (7.96) 0.255** (2.32) 0.262** (2.37)
Cti 1.222*** (22.22) 1.190*** (20.18) 2.743*** (5.99) 2.754*** (6.01)
Size 0.031*** (2.59) −0.57 (−0.59)
Efd 0.000 (1.09) −0.003 (−0.64)
Profit −0.007* (−1.92) 0.030 (0.27)
Constant 0.014 (074) −0.191*** (−2.57) −1067*** (−5.50) −0.690 (−1.00)
No. Of Obs. 3065 3065 3062 3062
Wald χ2 877.79 1212.54 127.45 127.69
Pseudo R2 63.66% 63.63%
Likelihood ratio test 866.54 863.04
This table contains estimates of macro-environment and firm-specific determinants of IFR adoption. The variable definitions are consistent with those in Table 1.
The panel logit model uses the binary variable version of the Full IFR which is computed as 1 if a country’s average percent of top 30 firms identified as using Full
IFR is greater than the median of same indicator for the group of countries (developing or developed) to which that country belongs, 0 if otherwise.
* Significance at the 10% confidence level.
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able 5 (models 5a–6b) largely confirm, as hypothesized, that
FR is negatively associated with the spread between lend-
ng and deposit rates (an important proxy for cost of debt) in
he sample countries. Importantly, not only does IFR signif-
cantly correlate with the measure of cost of funds, but also
acro-environment factors, firm-specific factors and CGM that
ere significantly important in earlier models appear equally
elevant in explaining cost of capital reduction, in accord
ith theory (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Frankel et al.,
w
t
v
able 4
eterminants of IFR adoption within corporate governance structure/model (CGM).
Clustered standard error based estimates of random effect m
Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c
e 0.043 (1.53) 0.005 (0.13) 0.089** (2.
e −0.066** (−2.55) −0.085*** (−3.04) −0.092***
ms 0.071*** (8.07) 0.078*** (8.38) 0.079*** (7
ti 1.194*** (21.04) 1.137*** (17.96) 1.155*** (1
ize 0.029** (2.55) 0.036*** (3.10) 0.019 (1.63
fd 0.000 (1.12) 0.000 (0.87) 0.000*** (4
rofit −0.007* (−1.71) −0.006 (−1.45) −0.007* (−
GM1 −0.010 (−0.76)
GM2 0.088*** (5.02)
GM3 −0.027* (−
onstant −0.143* (−1.95) −0.474*** (−5.23) 0.022 (0.28
o. of obs. 3065 2623 2490
ald χ2 1309.54 1235.26 1172.39
seudo R2 65.61% 72.39% 67.91%
ikelihood ratio test
his table contains estimates of macro-environment and firm-specific determinants of
ariable definitions are consistent with those in Table 1. The panel logit model uses th
verage percent of top 30 firms identified as using Full IFR is greater than the median
hat country belongs, 0 if otherwise. Models a-c of the estimation reflects separate en
* Significance at the 10% confidence level.
** Significance at the 5% confidence level.
** Significance at the 1% confidence level.995; Botosan, 1997; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; and
thers). In other words, these variables enter the equation
argely with the expected signs. A negative sign suggests
hat the coefficient contributes in reducing the lending-
eposit spread while a positive sign suggest the converse.
he interactive effect of IFR and the governance structure
as also examined (models 6a–6c); these effects are statis-
ically significant, without altering the effects of the focus
ariables.
odels Panel logit based models
Model 4a Model 4b Model 4c
44) 1.843*** (5.18) 0.0390 (0.87) 2.442*** (5.31)
(−3.15) −1.262*** (−3.92) −0.324 (−0.91) −1.213*** (−3.35)
.96) 0.256** (2.22) 0.179 (1.62) 0.438*** (3.80)
7.74) 2.756*** (6.01) 3.548*** (7.17) 1.885*** (3.78)
) −0.054 (−0.56) 0.004 (0.40) −0.177* (−1.72)
.03) −0.003 (−0.64) −0.004 (−0.68) −0.004 (−0.55)
1.86) 0.030 (0.27) 0.031 (0.28) 0.027 (0.25)
0.027 (0.20)
−0.012 (−0.08)
1.83) −0.635*** (−5.28)
) −0.775 (−0.98) −1.149 (−1.22) 2.152** (2.53)
3062 2624 2487
127.35 89.59 101.23
861.27 701.07 539.80
IFR adoption, within the context of national corporate governance models. The
e binary variable version of the Full IFR which is computed as 1 if a country’s
of same indicator for the group of countries (developing or developed) to which
tries of the distinct corporate governance model constructs.
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Table 5
2SLS (with clustered SE) effects of IFR and CGM on market efficiency (low cost of funds – lending-deposit spread).
Independent effects of IFR and CGM Models including interaction effects of IFR & CGM
Model 5a Model 5b Model 5c Model 6a Model 6b Model 6c
IFR −0.976 (−1.46) −1.488** (−2.13) −1.756*** (−2.51) −8.361*** (−6.00) 3.773** (2.20) −0.027 (−0.20)
Pe −3.668*** (−3.22) −4.860*** (−3.61) −3.846*** (−3.26) −2.681** (−2.28) −5.096*** (−3.72) −3.985*** (−3.21)
Le 1.910* (1.87) 1.282 (1.25) 1.048 (1.14) 0.859 (0.82) 1.404 (1.36) 1.209 (1.25)
Fms 0.353** (2.47) 0.374** (2.23) 0.401*** (3.11) 0.113 (0.87) 0.279* (1.70) 0.417*** (3.22)
Cti −4.312*** (−2.93) −4.640*** (−3.07) −3.237** (−2.19) −3.845*** (−2.75) −4.717*** (−3.00) −3.357** (−2.16)
Size −0.805*** (−2.95) −0.578* (−1.92) −0.601*** (−2.46) −0.777*** (−2.83) −0.539* (−1.78) −0.590*** (−2.46)
Efd 0.000 (0.15) 0.000 (0.03) 0.000 (0.09) −0.000 (−0.22) −0.000 (−0.13) 0.000 (0.07)
Profit 0.001*** (4.33) 0.001*** (5.41) 0.001*** (6.62) 0.001*** (3.84) 0.001*** (4.84) 0.001*** (7.77)
CGM1 −2.044*** (−3.83) −3.100*** (−5.27)
CGM2 2.334*** (5.39) 3.345*** (5.54)
CGM3 0.471 (1.11) 0.754 (1.49)
IFR*CGM 2.721*** (7.23) −1.1554*** (−3.44) −0.511* (−1.65)
Constant 20.262*** (6.13) 6.573** (2.44) 12.117*** (5.93) 22.875*** (6.72) 3.306 (1.09) 11.151*** (5.51)
No. of obs. 2690 2446 2351 2699 2446 2351
Wald χ2 141.03 148.90 157.14 150.86 145.45 183.30
Pseudo R2 11.75% 13.03 6.33 12.13% 14.39% 6.01%
This table contains estimates of IFR effects on cost of capital (lending-deposit spread) with controls for national corporate governance structures, macro-environment
and firm-specific determinants of IFR adoption. The variable definitions are consistent with those in Table 1. Models a–c of the estimation reflects separate entries
of the distinct corporate governance model constructs or interaction effect of IFR and CGM.
* Significance at the 10% confidence level.
*
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.1. Robustness check
As noted in the variable definition section, one can con-
ider our definition of IFR (the main dependent variable in this
tudy) to be restrictive. Consequently, we repeat the above anal-
ses using an IFR construct that contained both of what we
ermed full-IFR and partial-IFR in Section 3.1. Our result (not
eported here) is robust to this redefinition. Further, we also
onsidered outliers. Results remain materially unchanged, with
rather marginal strengthening of most coefficients after the
runing of outliers. Finally, given the time-series nature of the
ata employed for this study, the data was checked separately
or serial correlation by using GLS with correlated disturbances.
o serial correlation problems were found.
. Conclusion and discussion
The adoption of internet financial reporting (IFR) is
ddressed in the context of the economics of financial report-
ng/disclosure as a means of mitigating agency problems, with
FR adoption argued to be a function of both the dominant
orporate governance model and the enabling infrastructures
n the country. Three main insightful questions emanated from
his contextualization of IFR adoption in a macro-environment
erspective; these questions were subjected to robust empiri-
al examinations. There is strong evidence that both physical
nd institutional infrastructures determine the propensity of
dopting IFR by a country, with four of the hypothesized
acro-environmental factors – computer/telecommunication
nfrastructure, financial market scope (economic), political and
egal institutions – significantly influencing a firm’s adoption
f IFR, even in the face of firm-specific efficiency gains of
fi
tFR usage. Further, the national corporate governance structure,
hich partly determines reach/speed of dissemination and con-
ent details of material information provided firms’ stakeholders,
s found to play a role in the adoption of IFR. Importantly, IFR,
s an embodiment of total disclosure, is found to retain its ulti-
ate essence of reducing cost of capital even after considering
he other relevant factors such as macro-environmental infras-
ructures and dominant national corporate governance practice.
This study emphasizes the corporate governance context and
hus, the agency cost mitigation of financial disclosure, by inte-
rating the literatures on IFR adoption (Ashbaugh et al., 1999;
ebreceny and Gray, 1999; and others) and the importance of
nancial disclosure and its linkages to infrastructure require-
ents (Ball et al., 1999; Kothari, 2000; Ball, 2001). It examines
nancial disclosure across 44 governance environments (12
eveloped economies and 32 developing economies) and thus,
rovides useful comparative analysis. It breaks new ground by
onsidering macro-environment predictors of firms’ propensity
o disclose financial information on the Internet. Prior works
n the area focused primarily on firm-level analysis (Ashbaugh
t al., 1999; Debreceny and Gray, 1999; Ettredge et al., 2002).
mportantly, we examine the robustness of the accepted notion
hat increased voluntary disclosure, by mitigating information
symmetry, ultimately reduces cost of capital (i.e., enhances
arket efficiency). Finally, the findings here contribute to the
ebate on harmonization of international financial reporting sys-
ems by showing, in agreement with Kothari (2000), Ball (2001)
nd others, that whichever reporting system is adopted will likely
e ineffectual unless the enabling environments are provided
rst.
This study having pointed towards a new useful direc-
ion to shift research on firms’ information reporting and
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Table A1
Country-by-country evolution of IFR adoption.
Country Full IFR
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Developing countries
Argentina 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 10 10 10 13 13 17 20 30 40 70 73 77
Brazil 0 7 17 17 20 23 40 40 40 43 43 43 43 43 43 60 90 93 93
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 38 50 63 63 88 88 88
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 33 33 43 43 50 53 63 70 77
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 17 20 20 23 23 37 43 53
Columbia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 13 17 20 20 23 23 37 43 53
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 8 17 17 17 25 25 29 33 33 38 46 54 79 83 83
Egypt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 13 27 27 43 50 53 57 77 80 87
Ecuador 0 0 0 10 13 13 13 20 20 27 40 40 40 47 47 57 77 80 87
Hungary 0 0 0 0 0 5 9 9 9 23 36 45 45 50 55 59 68 73 77
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 13 23 20 23 63 80 87
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 60 60 67
Korea 0 0 0 17 30 33 33 37 40 43 50 57 60 63 73 77 90 100 100
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 17 17 17 17 17 33 43 47 50 50 53 57 90 97 100
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 20 20 20 20 30 50 53 57 57 60 63 77 83 90
Nigeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 10 17 17 20 67 83 83
Pakistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 60 60
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 33 37 37
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 10 37 47 57
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 10 13 17 17 53 67 77
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 38 54 62
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 7 10 10 13 17 27 33 37 67 80 80
Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 33 47 57
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 18 29 35 41 47 53 59 76
South Africa 20 20 20 20 20 30 37 37 37 37 40 40 53 57 57 77 87 90 93
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 60 63
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 17 17 27 27 27 33 33 33 37 63 63 77 77 77
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17 33 33 37 50 53 63
Turkey 0 0 3 3 3 17 20 20 23 27 30 30 33 37 47 47 70 83 90
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 13 25 25 25 31 50 63 63
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 7 10 10 10 10 13 17 20 20 23 27 27 33 47 60
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 20 20
Sum 20 27 40 67 118 205 246 272 291 424 551 627 782 892 1017 1138 1910 2172 2335
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00 12.55 15.00 20.00 25.83 31.67 36.67 63.33 71.36 76.67
Mean 0.63 0.83 1.25 2.08 3.70 6.39 7.68 8.51 9.09 13.24 17.23 19.58 24.43 27.88 31.77 35.58 59.67 67.88 72.98
Standard deviation 3.54 3.69 4.54 5.47 7.71 9.95 11.74 12.41 12.99 14.62 17.62 18.02 18.90 19.76 22.44 24.48 20.89 19.34 18.16
Developed countries
Australia 20 20 20 20 20 37 37 37 37 53 83 83 83 83 83 83 100 100 100
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 17 20 20 20 47 43 40 47 47 47 57 97 100 100
Finland 0 0 3 10 10 23 30 30 30 30 63 63 67 70 80 80 97 97 100
Hong Kong 17 17 33 40 53 53 53 47 73 73 83 83 90 97 100 100 100 100 100
France 0 0 0 0 0 30 33 50 50 50 77 80 80 83 87 87 93 93 97
Japan 0 10 30 37 40 67 87 87 87 87 90 93 97 100 100 100 100 100 100
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 17 27 27 27 27 33 40 43 43 53 57 93 100 100
Sweden 7 10 17 17 17 47 47 50 53 60 63 87 87 90 93 97 97 97 97
Switzerland 27 27 43 43 60 60 60 63 63 70 77 77 83 87 90 93 97 97 97
United Kingdom 0 0 23 60 60 60 70 70 70 70 80 80 80 93 93 93 100 100 100
United States 17 17 17 17 27 57 57 73 73 73 77 83 90 90 93 97 100 100 100
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 17 50 67 73
Sum 87 100 187 243 287 467 520 553 583 640 770 810 847 883 927 960 1123 1150 1163
Median 0.00 5.00 16.67 16.67 18.33 41.67 41.67 48.33 51.67 56.67 76.67 80.00 81.67 85.00 88.33 90.00 96.67 100.00 100.00
M 48.61
S 26.15
d
s
s
t
Iean 7.22 8.33 15.56 20.28 23.89 38.89 43.33 46.11
tandard deviation 9.93 9.69 15.06 20.32 23.90 21.48 23.70 24.90
isclosure – macro-level versus micro-level analysis, leaves
everal rooms for further research at this macro-level. One of
uch new areas for further research intervention is the need
o delve further into possible differences in the adoption of
a
d
m53.33 64.17 67.50 70.56 73.61 77.22 80.00 93.61 95.83 96.94
24.62 26.33 27.42 27.81 29.52 27.95 24.98 13.96 9.44 7.58
FR across significantly disparate countries, for example the
doption variation between emerging market economies and
eveloped market economies. The level of economic develop-
ent, which is expectedly influential on macro-environmental
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Table A2
Definitions of three different constructs of corporate governance model (CGM).
Country Legal/Law
Origin CGM1
Schwartz culture
region
Ranking of culture
region CGM2
Hofstede
culture region
Ranking of culture
region CGM3
Argentina 1 Latin A 3.7 Dev Latin 3.7
Australia 3 Eng Spkg 5 Anglo 5
Brazil 1 Latin A 3.7 Dev Latin 3.7
Bulgaria 0 E. Europe 2.7
Canada 3 Eng Spkg 5 Anglo 5
Chile 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
China 2 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Colombia 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
Czech Republic 2 E. Europe 2.7
Ecuador 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
Egypt 1 Near Eastern
Finland 2 W Europe 4.7 Nordic 5.3
France 1 W Europe 4.7 Dev Latin 3.7
Hong Kong 3 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Hungary 2 E. Europe 2.7
India 3 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Indonesia 1 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Japan 2 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Korea, Rep. of 2 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Malaysia 3 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Mexico 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
Netherlands 1 W Europe 4.7 Nordic 5.3
Nigeria 3 African 3
Pakistan 3 Near Eastern
Peru 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
Philippines 1 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Poland 2 E. Europe 2.7
Romania 0 E. Europe 2.7
Russian Federation 0 E. Europe 2.7
Saudi Arabia 0 Near Eastern
Singapore 3 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Slovakia 2 E. Europe 2.7
South Africa 3 Anglo 5
Sri Lanka 3 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Sweden 2 W Europe 4.7 Nordic 5.3
Switzerland 2 W Europe 4.7 Germanic 4.3
Taiwan 2 Far East 2.3 Asian 3.3
Thailand 3 Asian 3.3
Turkey 1 E. Europe 2.7 Near Eastern
Ukraine 0 E. Europe 2.7
United Kingdom 3 Eng Spkg 5 Anglo 5
United States 3 Eng Spkg 5 Anglo 5
Vietnam 0 Asian 3.3
Venezuela 1 Latin A 3.7 LessD Latin 1.3
These CGM constructs are meant to reflect the “diffused shareholder governance model” the higher their value is and vice versa. CGM1 is based on La Porta
et al’s legal origin classification, where Common Law legal origin is deemed most reflective of the “diffuse shareholder corporate governance model” (=3), the
German/Scandinavian Civil-Law origin is next (=2), Civil-Law French origin follows (=1), others (largely transition East European countries) have their CGM1
c ensio
H s. En
f
d
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n
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t
t
w
t
Aoded 0. CGM2 is constructed by averaging Schwartz’s regional cultural dim
ofstede’s power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and individualism dimension
actors, might affect macro-environmental determination of IFR
ifferently between these two economic groups.
Finally, this study adds to our concern about the unsettled
ssue of appropriate surrogates for national corporate gover-
ance models. As Licht et al. (2005) demonstrated, there is yet
o comprehensive construct of national corporate governance
odel; existing ones such as La Porta et al.’s (1998, 2000) legalrigin based construct must be viewed as nuanced and pertaining
o certain aspects of a corporate governance structure. Therefore,
here exists a need for perhaps a multidimensional definition of
R
Ans of autonomy and egalitarianism while CGM3 is constructed by averaging
g Spkg is English speaking while LessD Latin is Less Developed Latin.
hat would proxy well a national corporate governance struc-
ure.
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